Calculating the Regulatory Surcharge for US G-SIBs
Bryan Feierstein and Chris Donohue on Method 1 and Method 2, and what the 2022 data implied for the 2023 US G-SIB surcharge.
Bryan Feierstein and Chris Donohue, GARP Benchmarking Initiative (GBI). August 2022. The original paper is embedded below and can be downloaded. SSRN abstract 4172390.
Abstract
Bank regulatory bodies at both the global and local levels responded to the financial crisis of 2007–08 by requiring the largest, most inter-connected banks to hold extra layers of regulatory capital, in addition to the regulatory minimum of 4.5%, in the form of capital buffers. At the global level, the Financial Stability Board, in conjunction with Basel, updates its capital buffers, known as the G-SIB surcharge, on an annual basis. Regulatory bodies around the world, including the Federal Reserve Board in the United States, adopted their own frameworks around capital buffers. This paper examines the methodologies behind the global and US capital surcharges that are levied upon the eight largest, most inter-connected US banks and projects expected changes to the US G-SIB surcharges for 2023.
1. Introduction
Current regulatory capital requirements and capital adequacy standards applicable to the largest US banks were enacted by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) in 2013 in response to the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The regulation set a minimum required Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio of 4.5% plus a capital conservation buffer equal to 2.5% of CET1 capital.
An amendment proposed by the FRB in 2014 and enacted at the beginning of 2015 established an additional risk-based capital surcharge for the largest, most interconnected US bank holding companies, otherwise known as Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). This G-SIB surcharge became binding on 1 January 2019, following a three-year phase-in period, and is reassessed annually by the FRB during the first quarter. The G-SIB surcharges in effect as of the date of this publication were released by the FRB in August 2021, with effect from 1 October 2021 through 30 September 2022.
A further tweak, adopted in March 2020, replaced the static capital conservation buffer with a stressed capital buffer meant to reflect results of the annual CCAR supervisory stress tests. The minimum required capital for a bank designated as a G-SIB in the US therefore has three components, one fixed and two floating.
There are eight G-SIBs regulated by the FRB: Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street and Wells Fargo.
This white paper explains the methodologies for calculating the surcharge for US G-SIBs and projects expected changes to the surcharges for 2023. The analysis uses quarterly data published by the US G-SIBs and held in the GBI Pillar 3+ database to construct a pro-forma quarterly G-SIB surcharge for each bank and compare it with the annual surcharges published by the Federal Reserve Board.
2. US G-SIB surcharge methodologies
The US G-SIB surcharge is calculated under two methodologies, Method 1 and Method 2. Method 1 was set by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in consultation with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Method 2 was set by the Federal Reserve Board for US G-SIBs.
The FSB publishes the list of G-SIBs and the Method 1 capital surcharges each November. The surcharges take effect on 1 January of the second year after release. Surcharges published in November 2021 take effect on 1 January 2023. The first G-SIB list was published in November 2011, with twenty-nine banks, and the first Method 1 surcharges in November 2012. At the time of writing, the November 2021 update listed thirty banks. National authorities may set an alternative surcharge, but it is bound by Method 1. The US Method 2 surcharge is the more conservative of the two.
Both methodologies use quantitative indicators correlated with systemic importance. A SiFi (Systemically Important Financial Institution) score is the weighted sum of the indicator scores, and that score is then mapped to a surcharge. The indicators fall into six categories:
- Size: total exposures under the Basel III leverage ratio.
- Interconnectedness: intra-financial system assets, intra-financial system liabilities, and securities outstanding.
- Cross-jurisdictional activity: cross-jurisdictional claims and cross-jurisdictional liabilities.
- Complexity: notional amount of OTC derivatives, Level 3 assets, and trading and available-for-sale securities.
- Substitutability, Method 1 only: assets under custody, payments activity, and underwritten transactions in debt and equity markets.
- Short-term wholesale funding, Method 2 only: short-term wholesale funding on a consolidated basis for each business day of the previous calendar year, weighted by remaining maturity.
For Method 1, each indicator score is the bank’s indicator value divided by the sample total, multiplied by 10,000 and expressed in basis points. The sample total is compiled annually by the BCBS from the indicator values of the world’s largest banks, generally the largest 75 by Basel III leverage exposure, and prior-year G-SIBs are included so the set can exceed 75. The substitutability score is capped at 500 basis points, and a score can be adjusted by supervisory judgment. For Method 2, each indicator score is simply the indicator value.
Replacing substitutability with short-term wholesale funding is a significant departure from Basel. It measures how far a bank funds its balance sheet with short-term liabilities. Method 2 also puts much greater weight on Level 3 assets and on trading and available-for-sale securities, and much less weight on derivatives and on overall size. Level 3 assets are the most illiquid and the hardest to value.
| Category | Indicator | Method 1 | Method 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Size | Total exposures (Basel III leverage ratio) | 20% | 4.423% |
| Interconnectedness | Category total | 20% | 33.553% |
| Intra-financial system assets | 6.66% | 12.007% | |
| Intra-financial system liabilities | 6.66% | 12.490% | |
| Securities outstanding | 6.66% | 9.056% | |
| Substitutability | Category total | 20% | |
| Payment activity | 6.66% | ||
| Assets under custody | 6.66% | ||
| Underwritten transactions in debt and equity markets | 6.66% | ||
| Complexity | Category total | 20% | 191.501% |
| Notional amount of OTC derivatives | 6.66% | 0.155% | |
| Trading and available-for-sale securities | 6.66% | 30.169% | |
| Level 3 assets | 6.66% | 161.177% | |
| Cross-jurisdictional | Category total | 20% | 19.203% |
| Cross-jurisdictional claims | 10% | 9.277% | |
| Cross-jurisdictional liabilities | 10% | 9.926% | |
| Short-term wholesale funding | Weighted short-term funding amount | 100% |
SiFi scores are then mapped to a surcharge. The bands are the same under both methods up to a score of 529. Above 529, the Method 1 surcharge rises by 1 percentage point for every 100 basis points of score, and the Method 2 surcharge rises by 0.5 percentage point.
| Score | Method 1 surcharge | Method 2 surcharge |
|---|---|---|
| 0–129 | 0% | 0% |
| 130–229 | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| 230–329 | 1.5% | 1.5% |
| 330–429 | 2.0% | 2.0% |
| 430–529 | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| 530–629 | 3.5% | 3.0% |
The surcharge assigned by the FRB is the greater of the Method 1 surcharge and the Method 2 surcharge. Tables 3, 4 and 5 compare the effective Method 1 surcharge, the calculated Method 2 surcharge, and the difference. Apart from State Street from the first quarter of 2020, where the two methods are equal, Method 2 has been the more conservative methodology since inception.
| US G-SIB | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank of America | 2.0% | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.5% |
| BNY Mellon | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| Citigroup | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% |
| Goldman Sachs | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.0% |
| JPMorgan Chase | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.0% |
| Morgan Stanley | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| State Street | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| Wells Fargo | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.0% |
| US G-SIB | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank of America | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| BNY Mellon | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.5% |
| Citigroup | 3.0% | 3.0% | 3.0% | 3.0% |
| Goldman Sachs | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| JPMorgan Chase | 3.5% | 3.5% | 3.5% | 3.5% |
| Morgan Stanley | 3.0% | 3.0% | 3.0% | 3.0% |
| State Street | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| Wells Fargo | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% |
| US G-SIB | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank of America | 0.5% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| BNY Mellon | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% |
| Citigroup | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% |
| Goldman Sachs | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.5% |
| JPMorgan Chase | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.5% |
| Morgan Stanley | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.0% |
| State Street | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Wells Fargo | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 1.0% |
For Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the average difference corresponds to a 1.56% increase in the G-SIB surcharge over the Basel assignment. For the money-centre banks — Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo — the average difference corresponds to a 0.91% increase, and for the custodial banks — BNY Mellon and State Street — a 0.38% increase.
There is a further timing rule. At the beginning of year T, the FRB makes an initial Method 2 assessment from each bank’s prior year-end indicators. If the indicative surcharge is a decrease, it takes effect on 1 January of year T+1. If it is an increase, it takes effect on 1 January of year T+2, unless the assessment in year T+1, based on first-quarter data, is itself a decrease, in which case that lower surcharge is used. Banks therefore have a one-year grace period in which to bring an increased score back down.
For each US G-SIB, the surcharge the FRB implements for year T is the greater of the Method 1 surcharge set by the FSB for that year and the minimum of the two Method 2 readings the paper sets out: the Method 2 surcharge for year T based on year T−2 data, and the Method 2 surcharge based on year T−1 data. The printed formula, and the charts of the score changes, are in the original paper below.
On first-quarter 2022 data, the 2023 Method 2 calculation would raise the G-SIB surcharge by 0.50% for Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase. Because of the timing rule, those 2023 increases correspond to changes in the underlying indicators in 2020.
- Citigroup: the SiFi score rose by 60.8, mainly from cross-jurisdictional liabilities (15.2), size (13.8) and Level 3 assets (13.2).
- Goldman Sachs: the SiFi score rose by 36.9, mainly from size (7.2), cross-jurisdictional liabilities (7.1), cross-jurisdictional claims (6.6) and Level 3 assets (5.4).
- JPMorgan Chase: the SiFi score rose by 109.9, mainly from size (29.3), cross-jurisdictional claims (23.9) and intra-financial system liabilities (22.7).
3. Summary
The G-SIB surcharge requires an additional buffer of capital for the largest, most interconnected banks. In the US it is derived from Method 1, set by the Financial Stability Board and Basel, and Method 2, set by the Federal Reserve Board.
Since full implementation in 2019, Method 2 has been the more conservative methodology and has produced higher surcharges for the US G-SIBs than Basel. Because of the timing of both calculations, and the grace period the FRB allows when a surcharge increases, a forecast has to follow the underlying systemic indicators across more than one horizon.
The authors said they would continue to monitor and report, each quarter on the Pillar 3+ platform, their estimates of the Method 2 surcharges and the resulting expected surcharges for the US G-SIBs.
The derivation history in Table 6, and Figures 1 to 3, are set in the original paper so the printed layout is preserved. Email: bryan.feierstein@garp.com and chris.donohue@garp.com. The analysis used the GBI P3+ platform, covering Pillar 3 disclosures, Basel high-level indicators, and US reports including FFIEC 101, FFIEC 102, Y-9C and Y-15.
